Abstracts of Recent Decisions by Editors,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
1
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.
2
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
3
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
4
SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA.
5
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
6
AGENCY. See Banks and Banking; Evidence.
AGREEMENT. See Estoppel.
BANKS AND BANKING.
Liability of Bank for Bonds deposited-Demand, when necessary-
Duty of Bank to deliver ipecial Deposits- Witnesses, competency of
Directors of Bank as-Agency.-W lien bonds are deposited with a
national bank, a demand for their delivery and refusal before possession
is taken of them by the federal authorities, is necessary to an action for
their converion; but, if they are wrongfully transferred by the bank
or its cashier, and put with the funds of the bank and reported and
treated by the bank as a part of its assets, this being a conversion, no
demand and refusal will be necessary in order to maintain trover: Bank
of Monmouth v. Dunbar, 118 Ill.
A national bank after its failure, and its property has passed into the
hands of the federal authorities, has the right, and it is its duty under
sect. 5228 of the Rev. Stats. of the United Statutes, to deliver special
deposits: Id.
In an action by an administrator against a bank for the conversion of
municipal bonds specially deposited, the bank directors, being parties
in interest, are incompetent to testify generally as witnesses in behalf of
the bank ; and the fact that the cashier of the bank may have bought
the bonds for the intestate as his agent, and testified in the case, will
not authorize the directors to testify to matters happening after the
termination of such agency : Id.
When a bank customer employs the cashier of the bank to purchase
bonds for him, and after the purchase, places them on special deposit
with the bank, the cashier, after such purchase and deposit, ceases to be
agent for the owner of the bonds, and if he afterward transfers the bonds
to the bank to conceal his own embezzlement of funds, he will be acting
I From J. C. Bancroft Davis, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 119 U. S. Rep.
2 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 118 Ill. Rep.
3 To appear in 143 or 144 Mass. Rep.
4 From J. Shaff Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 65 Md. Rep.
5 From Hon. Then. T. Davidson, Reporter ; to appear in 95 N. C. Rep.
6 To appear in 103 or 104 N. Y. Rep.
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as the agent fur the bank, and notice to him of the ownership of the
bonds will be notice to the bank; Id.
Checks-Bills of E.xchange.-The essential characteristic of a check
is, that it shall be instantly payable, on demand : Merchants' Nat. Bunk
v. Ritzinger, 118 I1.
An instrument in the form of a check, by a depositor upon his banker,
is not a draft or bill of exchange merely because it is drawn by a party
out of this state on a bank in this state, or contains the words " origi-
nal," and "second unpaid." The use of these words does not make its
payment conditional : 11.
The issue of more than one copy of a bill of exchange or check upon
a bank does not, in any sense, render the instrument conditional. The
whole of the set constitutes, in law, but one bill, and the payment or
cancellation of either of the sets is a discharge of all : Id.
Collections-Application of Proceeds-Liability therefor.-If the
holder of a draft instructs his banker to collect the money due on it, and
hold the same until called for, and the bank, in violation of such instruc-
tion, pays the same to another by crediting it to the account of the lat-
ter, it will be liable to the person for whom it made the collection : In-
ternational Bank v. Ferris, 118 Il.
But where the collection is made for the owner under his direction,
or under an instruction of a person accompanying him, given in his pre-
sence and hearing, to hold the money until one or the other of the two
should give directions as to its disposition, and such other person after-
ward has the same paid to himself, or placed to his credit to make good
his overdrawn account, the bank will not be liable to the owner for
whom the collection was made: Id.
Depositors- Unauthorized Payment of Money of- Custom-Signa-
ture Book-Principal and Agent- Power of Attorney.-Whcre the
drawer of a check upon one bank in favor of another, delivers the
check to a person, with verbal instructions to deposit it to the drawer's
credit in the bank in favor of which it is drawn, and, instead, that per-
son deposits it there to his own credit, as trustee for the drawer, and
afterwards draws the money, the bank is liable to the drawer of the
check for the money so paid: Sims v. U- S. Trust Go., 103 or 104
N.Y.
The fact that a bank makes a practice of requiring the signature of
customers to accompany their deposits will not protect it from liability
of the real owner for money received without taking his signature: I1.
A power of attorney authorizing the donee therein named to collect
all moneys due, or to become due, his principal on "rents, accounts,
bonds and mortgages, or otherwise," and to do all business with a par-
ticular bank named in the power, in his principal's name, which the
principal could do were he present, gives the attorney no authority to
draw money of his principal from another bank: Id.
Deposit-Payment of Wife's .Money an T'ustee Process against Hus-
hand.-In an action by a married woman against a savings' bank for
money had and received by the defendant to the plaintiff's use, where
the answer admits a deposit in the plaintiff's name: but claims that a
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
part was held and paid under trustee process against the plaintiff's hus-
band, and, on tbe trial, the plaintiff testifies that the money was her own,
and her husband, who was regarded by the bank as the principal, dis-
claims the fund, the court should not direct a verdict for the defend-
ant: Townsend v. Webster Five Cent Say. Bank, 143 or 144 Mass.
When Bank chargeable with Notice of Trust-Action-Money had
and Received-Prvily of Contract.-When commission men; for the
purpose of transmitting their principal's money in the country, deposited
the same in a city bank to the credit of the country bank for the use of
their principal, with a ticket showing for whose use the deposit was
made, and the city bank accepted the same and gave a certificate that
the amount had been carried to the credit of the country bank for the
use of the principal, it was held, that these facts charged the city bank
with full notice of the ownership of the money and of the trust charac-
ter in which it was to be transmitted to the country bank : Drovers'
2at. Bank v. O'Hare, 118 or 119 Ill.
In such case the liability assumed by the city bank was to pay to the
country bank for the use of the owner the amount of the deposit, and
upon such payment being made and acceptance thereof, the liability of
the city bank would cease, and the country bank would become liable
to the person for whose benefit the deposit was made : Id.
Where a party deposited money in a city bank to the credit of his
country bank, for his use, this course being adopted as a means for the
transmission of the funds to the depositor's place of business, and the
city bank transferred the funds to another city bank, which was
the correspondent of the country bank, without any notice that the
country bank was a mere trustee for another, and the funds were placed
to the credit of the country bank, and on its failure they were applied
on its indebtedness to its correspondent bank : Held, that there being
no privity of contract between the depositor and the second city bank,
he could not maintain an action against that bank, but had his action
against the first named bank: Id.
Right of Set-off against a Deposit-Entry in Books- Contrary to
I.otice of Facts-Depositor-Right to Check against Deposit.-A bank
has the right of' set.off as against a deposit, only where the individual,
who is both depositor and debtor, stands in both these characters alike,
in precisely the same relation, and on precisely the same footing toward
the bank. Hence, an individual deposit cannot be set off against a part-
nership debt: International Bank v. Jones, 118 or 119 Ill.
Where a firm is dissolved, which is largely indebted to a bank for
overdrafts upon its deposits, and the bank has -notice of the dissolution,
and of the fact that one of the partners continues the business in the
old firm name, and such partner afterward makes a deposit, against
which he issues his check, the holder of such check will be entitled to
be paid out of such deposit, and in such case it is immaterial in what
book or in what manner the entry of the deposit is made, if the bank, at
the time of such entry, knew such deposit was made by the partner so
continuing the business for himself, though in the old firm name : Id.
Although a partner making an individual deposit with a bank is
under a legal obligation to pay a debt to the bank owing by a firm of
which he was a member, he may lawfully appropriate his deposit to a
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bonafide creditor by drawing a check in his favor, and thereby vest
him with full power to sue for and collect the same of the bank: 1d.
BANKRUPTCY. See Damages.
COMMON CARRIER.
Sleeping- Car Company- Liability for Property Stolen-Notice dis-
claiming Liability-Evidence-Negligence.-A sleeping-car company is
bound to use reasonable care to guard a passenger on its cars from
theft; and if, through want of care, the personal effects of a passenger,
such as he might reasonably carry with him, are stolen, the company is
liable: Lewis v. Sleeping-Car Co., 143 or 144 Mass.
The fact that the company has posted a notice in its cars in which it
disclaimed liability for the loss of valuables by passengers cannot be
availed of, by way of a defence to an action by a passenger whose money,
which le had placed beneath the pillow in his berth on going to sleep,
was stolen, where it appears that the passenger did not see or know of
such notice: Id.
In an action against a sleeping-car company by a passenger, for money
stolen from his berth while he was asleep, the fact that another passen-
ger lost a sum of money in a similar manner at the same time is itself
some evidence of the want of proper watchfulness by the porter of the
car; and where there was evidence that the porter was found asleep in
the early morning, and that he was required to be on duty for thirty-six
hours continuously, whirh included two nights, a case is presented.
which must be submitted to the jury to determine whether or not there
was negligence on the part of the company in guarding its passengers:
td.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Suit in Personarm, with Attachment to enforce Lien-Jurisdiction-
Constitution of the United States-Surety.-The jib-boom of a vessel
towed by a steam-tug, in the Chicago river, at Chicago, Ill., struck a
building on land, through the negligence of the tug, and caused damage
to it. A statute of Illinois gave a lien on the tug for the damage, to be
enforced by a suit in personam against her owner, with an attachment
against the tug, and a judgment in personam against her owner and the
surety in a bond for her release. In such a suit, in a court of Illinois,
to recover such damage, such a bond having been given, conditioned to
pay any judgment in the suit, and the tug having been released, an
application afterwards by ,., claiming to be part owner of her, to be
made a defendant in the suit, was denied, and a judgment for the dam-
age was given against the defendant and the surety in the bond, without
personal notice to the latter, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court
of Illinois on a writ of error from this court : Held (1) The cause of
action was not a maritime tort of which an Admiralty court of the
United States would have jurisdiction ; (2) the state could create the
lien and enact rules to enforce it, not amounting to a regulation of com-
merce, or to an admiralty proceeding in rem, or otherwise in conflict with
the Constitution of the United States; (3) The actual proceeding in
this case was a suit inpersonam, with an attachment to enforce the lien,
and was not forbidden by that constitution ; (4) the provision of sub.
division 6, of sect. 9, of art. 1, of the Constitution of the United States,
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in regard to giving a preference to the parts of one state over those of
another, is nof a limitation on the power of a state; (5) the judgment
against the surety was proper, as the statute provided for it, and formed
part of the bond ; (6) J. was not unlawfully denied a hearing, because
he did not apply to be made a defendant until after the tug was dis-
charged : Johnson v. (Ihicago, &c., Elevator Co., 119 U. S.
Navigable Streams-mprovemnents-Dutyof Tonnage.-The provision
in the ordinance of 1787 that the navigable waters leading into the Mis-
sissippi and the St. Lawrence shall be common highways, forever free,
without tax, impost, or duty therefor, refers to rivers in their natural state,
and does not prevent the state of Illinois from iuiproving the navigation of
such waters within its limits, or from charging and collecting reasonable
tolls from vessels using the artificial improvements, as a compensation for
the use of those facilities: Hfuse v. Glover, 119 U. S.
A river does not change its legal character as a highway if crossings
by bridges or ferries are allowed under reasonable conditions, or if dams
are erected under like conditions : 1d.
If, in the opinion of a state, its commerce will be more benefited by
improving a navigable stream within its borders, than by leaving the
same in its natural state, it may authorize the improvements, although
increased inconvenience and expense may thereby attend the business
of individuals: Id.
A " duty of tonnage," within the meaning of the constitution, is a
charge upon a vessel, according to its tonnage as an instrument of com-
merce, for entering or leaving a port, or navigating the public waters of
the country: Id.
CONTRACT.
Conditional Order delivered to Agent-Delivery to Principal-Con-
sent of Signer of Order-Letter rescinding Order-Admissibility.-A
written order for goods delivered to the selling agent of a manufacturer,
with the understanding that the agent was to hold it for three or four
days, subject to the order of the signer, and to destroy it if the latter
should so decide, is not a contract, nor an offer, until delivered to the
manufacturer, with the consent of the signer: Morris v. Brightman,
143 or 144 Mass.
A letter written by the signer of the order to the agent, the day after
the delivery of tlh order, is admissible in evidence to show.that the
right to rescind has been exercised : .il.
CORPORATION. See Municipal Corporation.
CRIMINAL LAW."
Etradition-Jurisdiction of United AStates Court-Kidnapping.-
A plea to an endorsement in a state court that the defendant has been
brought from a foreign country by proceedings which are a violation of
a treaty between that country and the United States, and which are for-
bidden by that treaty, raises a question, if the right asserted by the plea
is denied, on which this court can review, by writ of error, the judg-
ment of the state court: Ker v. illinois, 119 U. S.
But where the prisoner has been kidnapped in the foreign country and
brought by force against his will within the jurisdiction of the state
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whose law he has violated, with no reference to an extradition treaty,
though one existed, and no proceeding or attempt to proceed under the
treaty, this court can give no relief, for these facts do not establish any
right under the constitution or laws or treaties of the United States : Id.
The treaties of extradition to which the United States are parties do
not guarantee a fugitive from the justice of one of the countries an asy-
lum in the other. They do not give such person any greater or more
sacred right of asylum than he had before. They only make a provision
that for certain crimes he shall be deprived of that asylum and surren-
dered to justice, and they prescribe the mode in which this shall be
done: Id.
The trespass of a kidnapper, unauthorized by either of the govern-
ments, and not professing to act under authority of either, is not a case
provided for in the treaty, and the remedy is by a proceeding against
him by the government whose law he violates, or by the party injured
Id.
How far such forcible transfer of the defendant, so as to bring him
within the jurisdiction of the state where the offence was committed,
may be set up against the right to try him, is the province of the state
court to decide, and presents no question in which this court can review
its decision : Id.
DAMAGES.
Bond-Liquidated Damages - Bankruptc~j.-In a bond "1 in the
penal sum of $10,000, liquidated damages," with condition that certain
third persons shall within a year release the obligee from a large num-
ber of debts held by them severally, and varying from $8000 to $10
each, the sum of $10,000 is a penalty, and not liquidated damages; and
in an action thereon the obligee, upon proof that none of those debts
were released by the holders within the year, but that immediately
afterwards he wab discharged from all of them in bankruptcy, can re-
cover nominal damages only: Bignall v. Gould, 119 U. S.
EQUITY.
lnjunction-Tercan tile Agency-Restraining Publication of Name.-
A bill in equity, alleging that the defendants have published, and intend
to publish in the future, the name and business standing of the plain-
tiff in the records and books of a mercantile agency, and praying for an
injunction to restrain such publication, cannot be maintained : Raymond
v. Russell, 143 or 144 Mass.
It is not within the jurisdiction of a court of equity to restrain, by
injunction, representations as to the character and standing of the plain-
tiff, or as to his property, although such representations may be false, if
there is no breach of trust or of contract involved: Id.
ESTOPPEL.
Sale of Grain stored with Elevator Compan/ having apparent Own-
crship-Secret Agreement.-Where owners and dealers in wheat place
it with an elevator company, and knowingly permit such company to
mingle it with other wheat purchased by the company, and to sell from
the common mass, thus clothing it with apparent ownership and au-
thority to sell the wheat, they are estopped to assert title thereto, as
VOL. XXXV.-25
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against an innocent purchaser for value, who bought in good faith, in
the usual course of business, believing such company to be the owner
of the wheat: and a private understanding between the dealers and the
company, cannot affect the rights of such innocent purchaser: Preston
v. Witherspoon, 143 or 144 Mass.
EVIDENCE. See Common Carrier.
E'eacherous Witness-Practice.--If a witness has made to the party
who calls him, or to the attorney of such party, a statement totally
variant from his sworn testimony, and on the faith of which statement
he has been called, he may be asked if he made such a statement; and
if he denies it, the proof of such statement is admissible, not for the
purpose of impeaching the general character of the witness, but for the
protection of the party calling him : Smith v. Briscoe, 65 Md.
If the plaintiff calls a witness, relying upon statements made to him or
his attorney, and when on the stand he proves the defendant's case, the
principles of justice require that the plaintiff should be able to show why
he called him: Id.
There are objections to either course, but the more objectionable
would be to hold the party bound by the evidence of such treacherous
witness; Id.
Such declarations must be restricted to those made to the party call-
ing him, or to his attorney, and made in reference to the case pending,
and must not be extended to statements made to others : Id.
But it is not every statement that may be made, even to the party liti-
gant, or his attorney, that should be allowed to be contradicted by the
party calling the witness. It should be left to the discretion of the
court before whom the case is tried, and it should be satisfied that
the party has been taken by surprise, and that the evidence is contrary
to what he had just cause to expect from the witness, based on his state-
ments, and that such statements were made about material facts in the
case: 1d.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
Power to Pay Testator's Bid at Foreclosure Sale-Acts in Good
Faith, before Qualifying, subsequently Ratified.-Testator, foreclosing a
mortgage on realty out of the state, bid it in at the sale for the amount
of all the prior liens and costs. Before completing the transaction he
died, and his executors, withoutwaiting to be sued, but acting in good
faith, under the advice of counsel, and with reasonable prudence and
care, paid the amount of the bid : Held, that being bound to fulfil their
testator's contract, they had a right to discharge the obligation volun-
tarily, without suit: Denton v. San ford, 103 or 104 N. Y.
Executors paid the purchase-money and took a deed of land bid in
by testator at foreclosure sale before qualifying as executors. After
qualifying, they ratified these acts, which were all done in good faith•
Held, no devastavit : Id.
Power of Sale in Will-Administrator Cum Testamento Annexo.-
An administrator, cum testamento annexo, can execute any power con-
ferred by the will on the executor therein named: ouncil v. Averett,
95 N. 0.
As a general rule, where a will directs lands to be sold for division
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among devisees, and no person is designated to make the sale, neither an
executor, nor an administrator with the will annexed, can execute the
power, but such power may be conferred upon them, either by express
words, or by reasonable implication from the provisions of the will : Id.
Where the fund to be divided is to be raised by a sale of both real
and personal property, or where the fund to be raised by the sale is to
pay debts, or discharge legacies, or is to pass into the hands of the exec-
utor, to be applied by him by virtue of his office, the executor can exe-
cute the power of sale, as to the realty, although the will does not con-
fer it on him in direct terms: Id.
So, where a testator gives all of his property of every description to
his wife for life, and at her death, to be sold and divided among his
children, it was held, that by necessary implication the will conferred
the power of sale on the executor, and a sale, by an administrator with
the will annexed, of the realty, made after the death of the life-tenant,
passed a good title ; Id.
"Power of Sale-Effect of Death of one of several Beneficiaries on.-
Where power is given in a will, to several executors, to sell real estate, a
sale by the executor who qualifies, or by the surviving executor, will be
valid, whether the power is merely discretionary, or is mandatory : Ely
v. Dix, 118 Ill.
It has been held, that when the object for which a power has been
created has been accomplished, or'has become impossible, or unattain-
able, the power itself will cease to exist. But where power is given to
executors to sell real estate for the purpose of creating a fund, in which
several persons are to participate, the death of one of the beneficiaries,
before there has been any attempt to exercise the power, will not in any-
wise operate to impair the authority of the executors to sell for the ben-
efit of the survivors. In such case, the object of the testator in making
provision for the fund, has not been wholly accomplished, nor has it
become entirely impossible or unattainable,-and so the power will not
have ceased to exist: Id.
INMUNCTION. See Equity.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Mortgage.
JURISDICTION. See Constitutional Law.
Of Circuit Court of the United States-Atust appear on Face of Re-
cord.-If the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States does
not appear on the face of the record, in some form, the decree is errone-
ous, and must be reversed: Peper v. Fordyce, 119 U. S.
A., a citizen of Arkansas, conveyed to B., a citizen of the same state,
real estate in Arkansas, in trust to secure the payment of notes due to
0., a citizen of 'Missouri, with power of sale in case of non-payment.
Subsequently, A. became insolvent, and assigned his property to D., a
citizen of Arkansas, in trust for the benefit of creditors: Reld, that, in
proceedings in equity commenced by D. to determine the amount of
indebtedness from A. to C., and to prevent the sale of the trust property
by B., and to obtain a cancellation of the conveyance to B. on payment
of the amount found due to 0 , B. was a necessary party, with interests
adverse to D. ; and as both were citizens of the same state, and as the
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jurisdiction of the Circuit Court depended alone upon the citizenship
of the parties, it was without jurisdiction: id.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
Evading Pay.ment of Railroad Fare-Probable Cause-Railroad
Police Officer-Authority to order Arrest.-The plaintiff was a passen-
ger on a train of the defendant's road, running from L. to S., and
offered to the conductor a ticket marked from L. to S. " and return," on
which he had ridden from L. to S. The conductor refused the ticket,
and demanded fare. According to the testimony of the conductor, the
plaintiff said he would get nothing but the ticket, and refused to leave
the train. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, he said he had
no money, because he supposed the ticket was good, but would pay when
he arrived at S., and offered the ticket as security, but it was refusred.
The evidence showed that the conductor allowed him to ride to S., when
he had him arrested, and made a complaint against him for fraudulently
evading the payment of his fare. After trial, the plaintiff was acquitted.
On these facts, held, that there was evidence of want of probable cause
to support a verdict for the plaintiff: Krulevitz v. Eastern Rd., 143 or
144 Mass.
On the arrival of the train at S., officers (having been notified) were
ready, and entered the car, when the conductor, who was a railroad
police officer, pointing to the plaintiff, said: "That is the man," and
told them to take him to the lock-up, which was done. Held. that the
jury might return a verdict for the plaintiff in a count for assault and
false imprisonment, on the ground that the conductor ordered the arrest,
not as a police officer, but as a conductor; so that, being made by the
local officers, who were not present when the offence was committed,
without a warrant, it was not authorized by the statute : Id.
MORTGAGE.
Foreclosure-Sae-Thsband and Wife-Right to Proceeds.- Where
A. and B., his wife, were each seised in fee of one undivided half of
certain premises, and A. gave to C. a mortgage of the premises to secure
the payment of money advanced for improvements on the same, with a
covenant that he was seised in fee of the whole estate, B. joining to
release dower, and all parties intending to mortgage the whole estate,
and, when the facts were discovered, B. gave to C. a quit-claim, deed of
her half interest, taking from C. an instrument of defeasance which
provided that, in case of sale, if half the proceeds was sufficient to pay
A.'s indebtedness to C., half the proceeds should be paid to B., and if
half was not sufficient, B. should receive the balance, B. is entitled, in
case of sale, to the share of the proceeds provided by the contract, and
her rights are not affected by a sheriff's sale of all the right in equity
which A. had in the mortgaged premises, although her c6ntract of de-
feasance was not recorded: U'nion ,Sav. Bank v. Pool, 143 or 144
Mass.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Power to Grade and Sod Centre of Streets-Assessments.-Where a
city by special charter is invested with the exclusive control of its
streets, with power to regulate and improve the same, the nature and
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manner in which they may be improved must in a large measure be left
to the discretion of its authorities, and they may rightfully cause a street
to be graded, and wheu its entire width is not needed for travel, they
may cause a strip in the centre thereof to be sodded, instead of gravelling
the entire street, and raise the cost thereof by special assessment upon
the property benefited thereby: Murphy v. Cityl of Peoria, 118 or 119
Ill.
Power to Provide for Water Works- To require Lateral Water
Pipes-Special Assessment, wizen Unreasonable and an Abuse of Power.
-Incorporated cities and towns have power to establish water works
within their limits for the convenience, comfort and welfhre of the pub-
lic, and the corporate authorities have a large discretion in the execu-
tion of this power, with which the courts cannot interfere, except in
case of a clear abuse : Warren v. City of Chicago, 118 or 119 Ill.
In the absence of any statute on the subject, it is for the corporate
authorities to say through what streets the main supply pipes shall be
laid down, so as to bring the water within the reach of consumers. It
is also for them to determine the exact line and locality of the main
supply pipe, in each street or avenue : Id.
In the exercise of this discretion, were it not for the inconvenience
and expense of tearing up the pavement or sidewalk in making repairs,
the corporate authorities would be justified in requiring the main pipe
to be laid along and up to the line dividing the street from the abutting
lots, with the necessary fixtures for the attachment of private pipes
opposite each lot; and the expense of this might be raised in whole or
in part by special assessment upon the abutting property : h .
So, when there is a demand for an extension of the main water pipe
in a street., and the plan adopted requires it to be laid in the centre line
of the street, such authorities may require the water to be conducted to
the edge of each lot by means of lateral or service pipes, with suitable
fixtures for the attachment of private pipes by the owners of such lots
I .
When city authorities have once established the line of its main water
pipes, and laid the same, whereby the water is brought within a reason-
able distance of the abutting lots, and as near to them as is usual, it is
at least doubtful whether they can, either at the public expense or the
cost of lot owners, provide by ordinance for the construction of lateral
or service pipes as an original and independent improvement for the
purpose of connecting the abutting lots with the main pipe in the street:
Id.
It would seem that when the water is brought in the usual way into
the main pipe in front of the lots, so that the connecting of the lots with
it is all that remains, the corporate authorities have discharged their
duty to the public. The laying of lateral pipes, connecting the main
pipe with the lots, is a matter of private concern, and to require such
pipes to be laid by lot owners at their own expense, when not needed, is
an unauthorized invasion of private rights : Id.
After a city had laid its main supply water pipes along a street, it pro-
vided by ordinance for the laying of lateral or service pipes, to be paid
by special assessment on the abutting lots, under which certain unim-
proved lots were arbitrarily divided, and each half assessed for one pipe,
when none were then needed, and one would be as many as might be
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required when the property was improved: Hield, that if the city had
the power to ihake any assessment for such proposed improvement, the
one made should not be enforced as being unreasonable and oppressive,
and for an abuse of power: Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Common Carrier.
PARTNERSHIP.
Advances under Agreement to become Partner.-Where A. advances
money to B., to be used in his business, taking his notes therefor, under
an agreement that A. might become an equal partner with B., consider-
ing the sums advanced as contributions to the capital of the firm, if, on
further examination, A. should so desire, and B. carries on the business
as his own, drawing more than half the profits therefrom, and crediting
A. on the books with interest on the notes, and A., seeing the interest
credited, claims that he is a partner, and should receive half the profits,
but no interest, and B. still continues to credit A. with interest, and to
treat the business as entirely his own, in a suit on the notes, the court is
justified in ruling that no partnership was ever formed: .forrill v.
Spurr, 143 or 144 Mass.
POWER OF ATTORNEY. See Banks and Banking.
PRACTICE. See Evidence.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. See Banks and Banking.
RAILROADS. See Malicious Prosecution.
SCHOOL LAW.
Lease of Basement of Church for School Purposes-Employment of
Teachers who are Catholics in Faith-Religious E.ercises-Schools not
to be Sectarian- When School House may be Leased.-When it be-
comes necessary for a board of education to procure a building in which
to keep a public school, they are authorized by law to lease a suitable
building for that purpose, and it matters not that such building had
been used for a church by some religious body: Millard v. Board of
Education, 118 or 119 Ill.
The statute has not prescribed any religious belief as a qualification
of a teacher in the public schools, and therefore the school auchorities
may select a teacher who belongs to any church or to no church, as they
may think best: Id.
A bill to enjoin a board of education from the use of school funds for
sectarian purposes, alleged that the children of Catholic parents and the
teachers, who were Catholics, were required to attend at a Catholic
church, the basement of which was used for the school, at eight o'clock
in the morning of school days, and hear mass read by the priest, and
then repair to the school room and engage in the study of the church
catechism for half an hour before the opening of the school, and at the
close of the school at noon, the "Angelus" prayer was read by the
teachers and pupils, but failed to show that the board were in any man-
ner connected with such exercises and requirements : Hfel, that the
bill did not show any ground of equitable relief, it not being shown
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that complainant had any children who were required, against his
wishes, to attend or receive any religious instruction 
: Id.
The free schools of this state are not established to aid any sectarian
denomination, or assist in disseminating any sectarian doctrine, and no
hoard of education or school directors have any authority to use the
public funds for such a purpose : Id.
When a proposition to raise money to build a school house, at a site
selected, is defeated by a vote of the people, the board of education or
directors, being required to keep school fbr at least six months in each
year, may lawfully rent any suitable building or room in which such
school may be kept, without any vote fbr that purpose: id.
SURETY. See Constitutional Law.
TAXATION.
Property in Transit from one State to another- Temporary Deten-
tion-Situs of Property for Purposes of Taxation.-Property in course
of transportation from one state to another, over one of our navigable
rivers, or over any of the public highways of the country, is not liable
to taxation as it passes over such highways, by the state authorities
along the lines thereof; nor, it would seem, if property, while in the
course of transportation over one of our navigable rivers, should be de-
tained by low water, or ice, or other cause, would it be liable to be taxed
by the authorities where the detention occurred : Burlington Lumber
Co. v. Willetts, 118 Ill.
A lumber company located at Burlington, Iowa, left a large quantity
of saw logs in a harbor or bayou on the Illinois side of the Mississippi
river for safe keeping, until needed, and had leased the land along the
shore and employed an agent in this state to take care of them, and it
appeared that the company had kept logs at such place for several years
before, and that they were kept at such place because they could be
kept there in greater safety, and at a less expense than at Burlington.
field, that such logs were subject to taxation in this state. The property
had a situs here, rendering it subject to taxation under state authority.
The owners might be deemed to be engaged in business in this state, so
far as the storage of the property was concerned: Id.
But an incorporated village has no authority of law to impose a cor-
porate tax upon property thus situated, and which is without its limits,
and being void, if levied, its collection may be enjoined : Id.
TRUST. See Will.
USAGE. See Evidence..
WATERS AND WATER-COURSES. See Constitutional Law.
Diverting Flow of Waters to Injury of Lower Proprietors-Strangers
contributing to lnjury-Liability.-W here a railway company diverts
the flow of surface water from its natural channel, and conducts it
through a ditch it has made along its right of way, and empties it into
a slough at a point where it overflows the land of another, the company
may be liable for such damages as result from its own acts, but it will
not be liable on account of any water that may be brought into such rail-
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road ditch by artificial drains of other parties, made without the sanc-
tion or approval of the company: Chicago and Alton Rd. v. Glenney,
118 Il.
Privilege of Locating Oyster Beds-License -Power of State over-
Right of Property in Oysters.-A non-resident of the state, whether he
be sole or part owner of land in the state, is incapacitated from holding
a lot for the planting of oysters: Hess v. Muir, 65 Md.
The privilege of locating oyster lots has no elements of a grant by
patent, but is simply a license, revocable at the pleasure of the legisla-
ture; it is merely a personal privilege to the recipient, neither inherit-
able nor assignable: -d.
The oysters deposited by the holder of a license during its continu-
ance, remain his personal property, with the right of selling or other-
wise disposing of them ; but the territory continues subject to the con-
trol of the state : Id.
WILL. See Executors and Administrators.
Construction of Legay.-A bequest of a pecuniary legacy "out of
the estate," or "to be paid," or " to be raised out of my estate," is a
charge first upon the personal, and after its exhaustion, upon the real
estate of the testator, unless it can be seen from the context, or other
parts of the will, that these terms were used in a more restricted sense,
and including only the personal estate : Worth v. Worth, 95 N. C.
The testator having in the first clause of his will, given a pecuniary
legacy to his wife to be paid to her in cash or bonds at her option out
of my estate," and in subsequent clauses made specific devises of the
greater part of his "real estate," but in disposing of his personal pro-
perty used the terms " my estate." Held, that the real estate specifi-
cally devised was not chargeable with the payment of the pecuniary
legacy to the wife : Id.
Trust-Precatory Words-Indefiniteness.-A will, after giving a large
number of pecuniary legacies to the testator's relatives and next of kin,
gave the sum of $10 to the Rev. I. -. Bowers; and immediately after
this last legacy there was the following clause : " I give, bequeath and
devise unto the Rev. H. G. Bowers, of Jefferson, 'Maryland, all the rest
and residue of my estate, and desire him to use and appropriate the same
for such religious and charitable purposes and objects, and in such sums
and in such manner as will in his judgment best promote the cause of
Christ:" Bield, (1) that the language used was just as effective, so far
as the testator's intention was concerned, to create a trust, as if the pro-
per technical term, "in trust," had been employed. (2) That such a
trust was void, being too vague and indefinite to be carried into effect;
and the property went to the heirs-at-law and next of kin of the testa-
tor: faught v. Getzendanner, 65 Md.
WITNESS. See Banks and Banking-Evidence.
